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Abstract
Despite the fact that epistemic connectives are sometimes interpreted in concrete structures defined by means of
runs and clock time functions, one of the things which strikes one when studying multiagent logics is how abstract
their semantics are. Contrasting this fact is the fact that real agents like robots in everyday life and virtual characters
in video games have strong links with their spatial environment. In this paper, we introduce multiagent logics
which semantics can be defined by means of purely geometrical notions: possible states are defined by means of the
positions in Rn occupied by agents and the sections of Rn seen by agents whereas accessibility relations are defined
by means of the ability of agents to imagine possible states compatible with what they currently see.
Keywords: Multiagent logics, spatial reasoning, axiomatization/completeness, decidability/complexity.
1 Introduction
The field of Artificial Intelligence known as knowledge representation and reasoning is con-
cerned with the problem of representing and reasoning about the knowledge of everyday enti-
ties called agents. In recent years, much activity in this field has centred on multiagent logics
— modal languages whose atomic sentences range over sets and whose epistemic connectives
represent operations involving those sets. In this respect, see [10], or [11] for an introduc-
tion, the most intensively studied epistemic connectives are modal operators of the form Ka
(“a knows that . . .”). Their semantics use two notions of Kripke models: possible state and
accessibility relation. Possible states are states of affairs describing what is true whereas ac-
cessibility relations are indistinguishability relations between states of affairs characterizing
the ability of agents to determine what states of affairs they can discriminate. And most find
these traditional notions like possible state and accessibility relation intuitively transparent.
Despite the fact that epistemic connectives are sometimes interpreted in more concrete struc-
tures defined by means of runs and clock time functions [12], one of the things which strikes
one when studying multiagent logics is how abstract their semantics are.
Contrasting this fact is the fact that real agents like robots in everyday life and virtual charac-
ters in video games have strong links with their spatial environment: they occupy positions in
it and they see sections of it. Moreover, the knowledge these agents have about their environ-
ment mostly depends on the positions they occupy and the sections they see: in the absence
of message exchange, a knows that b sees c only if a sees b. These features imply the new
opinion that geometrical notions like points and sets of points should be integrated into the
semantics of multiagent logics. This tension between a traditional abstract semantics and a
new spatial semantics disappears when one realizes that possible states and accessibility re-
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lations can be defined by means of purely geometrical notions: possible states can be defined
by means of the positions in Rn occupied by agents and the sections of Rn seen by agents
whereas accessibility relations can be defined by means of the ability of agents to imagine
possible states compatible with what they currently see. In order to elaborate on this idea,
we introduce an epistemic language where sentences like “a knows that b sees c” can be ex-
pressed.
The syntax of our language, in addition to the traditional epistemic connectives of the form
Ka (“a knows that . . .”) considered in [11, 12], for example, will include atomic formulas
of the form a⊲b (“a sees b”), the truth of which will depend on the position in Rn occupied
by agent b and the section of Rn seen by agent a. In this setting, the above-mentioned sen-
tence “a knows that b sees c only if a sees b” will be written Kab⊲c → a⊲b. Concerning
the semantics of our language, in this first attempt at modelling what agents can see and
what agents can know, we naturally work with certain simplifications. Firstly, we will require
that agents know all the logical consequences of their knowledge. This is the so-called log-
ical omniscience character of agents. For more on the various problems associated with it,
see [20, 21]. Secondly, we will require that the visual capacity of agents satisfies the follow-
ing conditions: agents can see through any agents that may be blocking their view; agents
are never faulty, i.e. they always see what they are physically able to see; agents can see in-
finitely far from their positions; if a sees b then a is perfectly informed about what direction
b is looking in.
The project of relating multiagent logics to space sprang from the fictional two-dimensional
world of Flatland created by Edwin Abbott in 1884. The third author of the present arti-
cle developed a logic for studying knowledge of agents along a line where sentences like
“a knows that b knows that light λ is on” can be expressed [18]. This logic turned out to
have a PSPACE-complete model checking problem and a PSPACE-complete satisfiabil-
ity problem. The original work was followed up then by further work in collaboration with
the first two authors that resulted in an axiomatization of a logic for studying knowledge of
agents along a line where sentences like “a knows that b sees c” can be expressed [2]. In
the present article, we generalize these multiagent logics to spaces of greater dimensions. Its
section-by-section breakdown is as follows. Section 2 defines the syntax and the semantics
of the multiagent logic we will be working with. In Section 3, we study its expressivity. Sec-
tion 4 gives the axiomatization in dimension 1 of our multiagent logic. In Sections 5 and 6, we
investigate the complexity of model checking problems and the complexity of satisfiability
problems. Section 7 presents some variants. Some proofs can be found in the annex.
2 Syntax and semantics
In this section, we will mostly be concerned with the syntax and the semantics of our multi-
agent logic. First, we are going to investigate a Cartesian semantics where for some positive
integer n, agents occupy positions in Rn. Second, we are going to investigate an abstract
semantics in dimension 1 where for some linear order T = (T,<) without endpoints, agents
occupy positions in T .
2.1 Syntax
Let AGT be a countable set of agents (with typical members denoted a, b, etc). The set of all
formulas (with typical members denoted φ, ψ, etc) is given by the rule
• φ ::= a⊲b | ⊥ | ¬φ | (φ ∨ ψ) | Kaφ.
The intended meanings of a⊲b and Kaφ are as follows:
• a⊲b: “a sees b”,
• Kaφ: “a knows that φ”.
EXAMPLE 2.1
The formula Kab⊲c can be read “a knows that b sees c”.
In atomic sentences like a⊲b, we will always assume that a, b are distinct. This simplification
is related to the fact that in Section 2.2, the section seen by an agent is assimilated to an open
subset of Rn not containing the position occupied by the agent. Let ⊲¯ be defined by
• a⊲¯b ::= ¬a⊲b.
Formulas like a⊲b and a⊲¯b are called literals. We adopt the standard definitions for the re-
maining Boolean connectives. As usual, for all agents a, we define the epistemic connective
Kˆa as follows:
• Kˆaφ ::= ¬Ka¬φ.
The notion of a subformula is standard. It is usual to omit parentheses if this does not lead
to any ambiguity. Considering an enumeration (a1, a2, . . .) of AGT , let k be a nonnegative
integer. We use φ(a1, . . . , ak) to denote the fact that φ is a formula whose agents form a
sublist of a1, . . . , ak. In this case, we shall say that φ is a k-formula. A set Σ of formulas is
k-maximal iff for all k-formulas φ, φ ∈ Σ, or ¬φ ∈ Σ.
2.2 Cartesian semantics
Let n be a positive integer. As we mentioned in the introduction, every agent occupies some
position in the space and sees some section of the space. Hence, the notion of an n-scope will
be of the utmost interest for us. An n-scope is a structure of the form (x, S) where x is an
element of Rn and S is a subset of Rn. x and S are respectively called the position of the n-
scope (x, S) and the section of the n-scope (x, S). In a first attempt at modelling what agents
can see and what agents can know, one must naturally work with certain simplifications. A
natural semantics to look at would be one where the agents’ scopes are cones of various
angles, with the agents’ positions at the basis of the cones. In a first setting, we will consider
that agents’ scopes are half spaces, with the agents’ positions being at the frontier of the
halfspaces. In this respect, we shall say that an n-scope (x, S) is simple iff
• S is an open half space,
• x is on the frontier of S.
EXAMPLE 2.2
If one considers Figure 1 in dimension 2, a 2-scope is defined by the point and the open half
plane located on the same side of the line through the point as indicated by the arrow.
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✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
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❆
❆
❆❑
R2
FIG. 1. A simple 2-scope.
We now provide a mechanism for interpreting our formulas in the Cartesian coordinate sys-
tem Rn. An n-world is a function u assigning to each agent a an n-scope u(a). Given an
n-world u and agents a, b, if u(a) = (xu(a), Su(a)) and u(b) = (xu(b), Su(b)) then xu(a)
and xu(b) are respectively the positions in R
n occupied by a and b in u and Su(a) and Su(b)
are respectively the sections of Rn seen by a and b in u. We will always assume that if a 6=
b then xu(a) 6= xu(b): distinct agents occupy distinct positions. An n-world u is said to be
simple iff for all agents a, the n-scope u(a) is simple.
EXAMPLE 2.3
In the simple 2-world represented in Figure 2, the positions and the sections of three distinct
agents are depicted.
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FIG. 2. A simple 2-world.
Given an n-world u and agents a, b, we shall say that a sees b in u iff
• Su(a) contains xu(b).
Remark that in simple n-worlds, no agent can see itself.
EXAMPLE 2.4
In the simple 2-world considered in Figure 2, a sees b, a does not see c, b sees a, b sees c, c
sees a and c does not see b.
n-worlds u and v are said to be indiscernible for agent a, in symbols u ≡na v, iff xu(a) =
xv(a), Su(a) = Sv(a) and for all agents b, if a 6= b then one of the following conditions
holds:
• a sees b in u, a sees b in v, xu(b) = xv(b) and Su(b) = Sv(b),
• a does not see b in u and a does not see b in v.
EXAMPLE 2.5
The simple 2-worlds considered in Figures 2 and 3 are indiscernible for agent a.
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FIG. 3. A simple 2-world.
Remark that ≡na is an equivalence relation on the set of all n-worlds. It will be used to
interpret the epistemic connective Ka. n-satisfaction is a 3-place relation |=
n between a
nonempty set W of n-worlds, an n-world u in W and a formula φ. It is inductively defined
as follows:
• W, u |=n a⊲b iff a sees b in u,
• W, u 6|=n ⊥,
• W, u |=n ¬φ iff W, u 6|=n φ,
• W, u |=n φ ∨ ψ iff W, u |=n φ, or W, u |=n ψ,
• W, u |=n Kaφ iff for all n-worlds v in W , if u ≡
n
a v then W, v |=
n φ.
As a result,
• W, u |=n a⊲¯b iff a does not see b in u,
• W, u |=n Kˆaφ iff there exists an n-world v in W such that u ≡
n
a v and W, v |=
n φ.
We shall say that a formula φ is valid (invalid) in a nonempty set W of n-worlds, in symbols
W valn φ (W invn φ), iff for all n-worlds u in W , W, u |=n φ (W, u 6|=n φ). A formula φ
is said to be satisfiable (falsifiable) in a nonempty set W of n-worlds, in symbols W satn φ
(W faln φ), iff there exists an n-world u in W such that W, u |=n φ (W, u 6|=n φ). Let Wns
be the set of all simple n-worlds.
EXAMPLE 2.6
If u is the simple 2-world depicted in Figure 2 then W2s , u |=
2 a⊲b and W2s , u |=
2 Kab⊲a. If
v is the simple 2-world depicted in Figure 3 then W2s , v |=
2 a⊲¯c and W2s , v |=
2 Kˆac⊲¯a.
Unless otherwise stated, we will always assume that all n-worlds are simple.
2.3 Abstract semantics in dimension 1
Let T = (T,<) be a linear order without endpoints. As we mentioned in the introduction,
every agent occupies some position in the space and sees some section of the space. Hence,
the notion of a T -scope will be of the utmost interest for us. A T -scope is a structure of the
form (x, S) where x is an element of T and S is a subset of T . x and S are respectively called
the position of the T -scope (x, S) and the section of the T -scope (x, S). We shall say that a
T -scope (x, S) is simple iff S is an open semi-interval and x is on the frontier of S.
EXAMPLE 2.7
If one considers Figure 4 in R, an R-scope is defined by the point and the open half line
located on the same side of the point as indicated by the arrow.
✉✲
R
FIG. 4. A simple R-scope.
We now provide a mechanism for interpreting our formulas in T . A T -world is a function
u assigning to each agent a a T -scope u(a). Given a T -world u and agents a, b, if u(a) =
(xu(a), Su(a)) and u(b) = (xu(b), Su(b)) then xu(a) and xu(b) are respectively the positions
in T occupied by a and b in u and Su(a) and Su(b) are respectively the sections of T seen
by a and b in u. We will always assume that if a 6= b then xu(a) 6= xu(b): distinct agents
occupy distinct positions. A T -world u is said to be simple iff for all agents a, the T -scope
u(a) is simple.
EXAMPLE 2.8
In the simple R-world represented in Figure 5, the positions and the sections of three distinct
agents are depicted.
Given a T -world u and agents a, b, we shall say that a sees b in u iff Su(a) contains xu(b).
Remark that in simple T -worlds, no agent can see itself.
EXAMPLE 2.9
In the simple R-world considered in Figure 5, a sees b, a does not see c, b sees a, b sees c, c
does not see a and c does not see b.
✉b✲ ✉a✛ ✉c✲
R
FIG. 5. A simple R-world.
T -worlds u and v are said to be indiscernible for agent a, in symbols u ≡Ta v, iff xu(a) =
xv(a), Su(a) = Sv(a) and for all agents b, if a 6= b then one of the following conditions
holds:
• a sees b in u, a sees b in v, xu(b) = xv(b) and Su(b) = Sv(b),
• a does not see b in u and a does not see b in v.
EXAMPLE 2.10
The simple R-worlds considered in Figures 5 and 6 are indiscernible for agent a.
✉b✲ ✉a✛ ✉c✛
R
FIG. 6. A simple R-world.
Remark that ≡Ta is an equivalence relation on the set of all T -worlds. It will be used to
interpret the epistemic connective Ka. T -satisfaction is a 3-place relation |=
T between a
nonempty set W of T -worlds, a T -world u in W and a formula φ. It is inductively defined
as follows:
• W, u |=T a⊲b iff a sees b in u,
• W, u 6|=T ⊥,
• W, u |=T ¬φ iff W, u 6|=T φ,
• W, u |=T φ ∨ ψ iff W, u |=T φ, or W, u |=T ψ,
• W, u |=T Kaφ iff for all T -worlds v in W , if u ≡
T
a v then W, v |=
T φ.
As a result,
• W, u |=T a⊲¯b iff a does not see b in u,
• W, u |=T Kˆaφ iff there exists a T -world v in W such that u ≡
T
a v and W, v |=
T φ.
We shall say that a formula φ is valid (invalid) in a nonempty set W of T -worlds, in symbols
W valT φ (W invT φ), iff for all T -worlds u in W , W, u |=T φ (W, u 6|=T φ). A formula φ
is said to be satisfiable (falsifiable) in a nonempty set W of T -worlds, in symbols W satT φ
(W falT φ), iff there exists a T -world u in W such that W, u |=T φ (W, u 6|=T φ). Let WTs
be the set of all simple T -worlds.
EXAMPLE 2.11
If u is the simple R-world depicted in Figure 5 then WRs , u |=
R a⊲b and WRs , u |=
R Kab⊲a.
If v is the simple R-world depicted in Figure 6 then WRs , v |=
R a⊲¯c and WRs , v |=
R Kˆac⊲¯a.
Unless otherwise stated, we will always assume that all T -worlds are simple.
3 Expressivity
AGT being a countable set of agents, the fact that distinct agents occupy distinct positions
imply that our multiagent logic forces its models to be infinite. In this section, we discuss
some results concerning the expressive power of our multiagent logic.
3.1 In dimension 1
Let T = (T,<) be a linear order without endpoints. Our language cannot distinguish between
the notion of satisfiability in W1s and the notion of satisfiability in W
T
s . In order to see why,
let us consider an enumeration a1, a2, . . . of AGT . Given a nonnegative integer k, we shall
say that a binary relation Z between W1s and W
T
s is a k-bisimulation between W
1
s and W
T
s
iff for all simple 1-worlds u(1) and for all simple T -worlds u(T ), if u(1) Z u(T ) then the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. For all positive integers i, j ≤ k, if ai sees aj in u
(1) then ai sees aj in u
(T ).
2. For all positive integers i, j ≤ k, if ai sees aj in u
(T ) then ai sees aj in u
(1).
3. For all positive integers i ≤ k and for all simple 1-worlds v(1), if u(1) ≡1ai v
(1) then there
exists a simple T -world v(T ) such that u(T ) ≡Tai v
(T ) and v(1) Z v(T ).
4. For all positive integers i ≤ k and for all simple T -worlds v(T ), if u(T ) ≡Tai v
(T ) then
there exists a simple 1-world v(1) such that u(1) ≡1ai v
(1) and v(1) Z v(T ).
Interestingly,
LEMMA 3.1
Let φ(a1, . . . , ak) be a formula. Let Z be a k-bisimulation between W
1
s and W
T
s . For all
simple 1-worlds u(1) and for all simple T -worlds u(T ), if u(1) Z u(T ) then W1s , u
(1) |=1
φ(a1, . . . , ak) iff W
T
s , u
(T ) |=T φ(a1, . . . , ak).
Given a nonnegative integer k, let Zk be the binary relation between W
1
s and W
T
s such that
for all simple 1-worlds u(1) and for all simple T -worlds u(T ), u(1) Zk u
(T ) iff for all positive
integers i, j ≤ k, ai sees aj in u
(1) iff ai sees aj in u
(T ). Let Z⋆k be the restriction to W
T
s of
the least equivalence relation on W1s ∪W
T
s containing Zk.
EXAMPLE 3.2
The simple R-worlds considered in Figures 7, 8 and 9 are in the binary relation Z⋆3 .
We have:
LEMMA 3.3
Zk is a k-bisimulation between W
1
s and W
T
s .
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 establish the following
PROPOSITION 3.4
Let φ be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
✉a1✲ ✉a2✲ ✉a3✛✉a4✲ ✉a5✲
R
FIG. 7. A simple R-world.
✉a1✲ ✉a2✲ ✉a3✛✉a4✲ ✉a5✛
R
FIG. 8. A simple R-world.
✉a3✲ ✉a2✛ ✉a1✛ ✉a4✛✉a5✛
R
FIG. 9. A simple R-world.
1. W1s sat
1 φ.
2. WTs sat
T φ.
PROOF. Let k be a nonnegative integer such that φ is a formula whose agents form a sublist
of a1, . . . , ak.
1.⇒2. Suppose W1s sat
1 φ(a1, . . . , ak). Hence, then there exists a simple 1-world u
(1)
such that W1s , u
(1) |=1 φ(a1, . . . , ak). Since T is a linear order without endpoints, then
there exists a simple T -world u(T ) such that the temporal relationships between a1, . . . , ak
in u(1) are equal to the temporal relationships between a1, . . . , ak in u
(T ). Obviously, u(1)
Zk u
(T ). Since W1s , u
(1) |=1 φ(a1, . . . , ak), then by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, W
T
s , u
(T ) |=T
φ(a1, . . . , ak). Thus, W
T
s sat
T φ(a1, . . . , ak).
2.⇒1. Suppose WTs sat
T φ(a1, . . . , ak). Hence, then there exists a simple T -world u
(T )
such that WTs , u
(T ) |=T φ(a1, . . . , ak). Since R is a linear order without endpoints, then
there exists a simple 1-world u(1) such that the temporal relationships between a1, . . . , ak
in u(1) are equal to the temporal relationships between a1, . . . , ak in u
(T ). Obviously, u(1)
Zk u
(T ). Since WTs , u
(T ) |=T φ(a1, . . . , ak), then by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, W
1
s , u
(1) |=1
φ(a1, . . . , ak). Thus, W
1
s sat
1 φ(a1, . . . , ak).
Proposition 3.4 has the following immediate consequence.
PROPOSITION 3.5
Let φ be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. W1s val
1 φ.
2. There exists a linear order T without endpoints such that WTs val
T φ.
3. For all linear orders T without endpoints, WTs val
T φ.
PROOF. 2.⇒1. By Proposition 3.4.
1.⇒3. By Proposition 3.4.
3.⇒2. Obvious.
3.2 In dimensions n ≥ 2
Let n ≥ 2. Our language can distinguish between the notion of satisfiability in W1s and the
notion of satisfiability in Wns . To illustrate the truth of this, let us consider the four following
examples. As a first example, take the formula
• ((a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a)↔ (b⊲c↔ c⊲¯b))→ (a⊲c↔ c⊲¯a).
✉a
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟
❆
❆
❆❯
✉b
❄
✉c
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍
✁
✁
✁☛
R2
FIG. 10. A simple 2-world.
Its validity in W1s follows from the fact that if a and b look into the same direction iff b and
c look into the same direction then a and c look into the same direction. Its falsifiability in
W2s is illustrated by Figure 10 where a simple 2-world satisfying a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a and b⊲c↔ c⊲¯b
— hence, satisfying (a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a)↔ (b⊲c↔ c⊲¯b) — and falsifying a⊲c↔ c⊲¯a is presented.
As a second example, take the formula
• ¬(a⊲b↔ a⊲¯c) ∨ ¬(b⊲c↔ b⊲¯a).
Its validity in W1s follows from the fact that a is not betwen b and c, or b is not between c
and a. Its falsifiability in W2s is illustrated by Figure 11 where a simple 2-world satisfying
a⊲b↔ a⊲¯c and b⊲c↔ b⊲¯a is presented. As a third example, take the formula
✉a
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟
❆
❆
❆❯
✉b
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄✄
❳❳③
✉c
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍
✁
✁
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FIG. 11. A simple 2-world.
• c⊲¯a ∧ c⊲¯b→ Kˆc(((a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a)↔ (b⊲c↔ c⊲¯b)) ∧ ¬(a⊲c↔ c⊲¯a)).
Its falsifiability in W1s is illustrated by Figure 5 where a simple 1-world satisfying c⊲¯a ∧ c⊲¯b
and falsifying Kˆc(((a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a)↔ (b⊲c↔ c⊲¯b))∧¬(a⊲c↔ c⊲¯a)) is presented. Its validity
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FIG. 12. A simple 2-world.
in W2s follows from the fact that if c sees neither a nor b then c can imagine the simple 2-
world illustrated by Figure 12 where ((a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a)↔ (b⊲c↔ c⊲¯b))∧¬(a⊲c↔ c⊲¯a) holds.
As a fourth example, take the formula
• c⊲¯a ∧ c⊲¯b→ Kˆc((a⊲b↔ a⊲¯c) ∧ (b⊲c↔ b⊲¯a)).
Its falsifiability in W1s is illustrated by Figure 5 where a simple 1-world satisfying c⊲¯a ∧ c⊲¯b
and falsifying Kˆc((a⊲b ↔ a⊲¯c) ∧ (b⊲c ↔ b⊲¯a)) is presented. Its validity in W
2
s follows
✉a
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
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FIG. 13. A simple 2-world.
from the fact that if c sees neither a nor b then c can imagine the simple 2-world illustrated
by Figure 13 where (a⊲b ↔ a⊲¯c) ∧ (b⊲c ↔ b⊲¯a) holds. Finally, for all we know, it is still
open whether our language can distinguish between the notion of satisfiability inWns and the
notion of satisfiability in Wn+1s .
4 Axiomatization and completeness
In this section, our goal is to provide the axiomatization of our multiagent logic in dimension
1. Such an axiomatization will enable us to underline the most representative properties of
sentences like “a knows that b sees c” when interpreted in R, or in linear orders without
endpoints.
4.1 Axiomatization
Let G be a finite group of agents. A G-vector is a pair ~u = (pos~u, sec~u) where
• pos~u is a function assigning to each agent a ∈ G a positive integer pos~u(a) ≤ Card(G),
• sec~u is a function assigning to each agent a ∈ G an element sec~u(a) ∈ {r, l}.
We will always assume that pos~u is injective.
EXAMPLE 4.1
If G = {a1, a2, a3} then the pair ~u = (pos~u, sec~u) defined by pos~u(a1) = 2, pos~u(a2) = 1,
pos~u(a3) = 3, sec~u(a1) = l, sec~u(a2) = r and sec~u(a3) = l is a G-vector. It corresponds
to a situation where a1 occupies the 2nd position and looks at its left, a2 occupies the 1st
position and looks at its right and a3 occupies the 3rd position and looks at its left.
Given a G-vector ~u and agents a, b ∈ G, a is said to be seeing b in ~u iff one of the following
conditions holds:
• pos~u(a) < pos~u(b) and sec~u(a) = r,
• pos~u(b) < pos~u(a) and sec~u(a) = l.
Remark that in G-vectors, no agent can see itself.
EXAMPLE 4.2
In the G-vector ~u considered in Example 4.1, a1 sees a2, a1 does not see a3, a2 sees a1, a2
sees a3, a3 sees a1 and a3 sees a2.
We now associate to each G-vector ~u the conjunction χ~u of the following literals based on
G:
• for all distinct agents a, b ∈ G such that a sees b in ~u, the literal a⊲b,
• for all distinct agents a, b ∈ G such that a does not see b in ~u, the literal a⊲¯b.
EXAMPLE 4.3
The conjunction χ~u associated to the G-vector ~u considered in Example 4.1 is a1⊲a2 ∧
a1⊲¯a3 ∧ a2⊲a1 ∧ a2⊲a3 ∧ a3⊲a1 ∧ a3⊲a2.
Let a ∈ G. We shall say that the G-vector ~v is a-compatible with the G-vector ~u, in symbols
~u ≡Ga ~v, iff for all b ∈ G, if a 6= b then one of the following conditions holds:
• a sees b in ~u, a sees b in ~v, pos~u(b) = pos~v(b) and sec~u(b) = sec~v(b),
• a does not see b in ~u and a does not see b in ~v.
EXAMPLE 4.4
The G-vector ~v = (pos~v, sec~v) defined by pos~v(a1) = 2, pos~v(a2) = 1, pos~v(a3) = 3,
sec~v(a1) = l, sec~v(a2) = r and sec~v(a3) = r is a1-compatible with the G-vector ~u consid-
ered in Example 4.1.
Remark that ≡Ga is an equivalence relation on the set of all G-vectors. It will be used to
provide one of the proper axioms of our multiagent logic. To continue, another technical
lemma is necessary.
LEMMA 4.5
The following decision problem is decidable by a deterministic Turing machine in logarithmic
space:
Input: a finite group G of agents, an agent a ∈ G and G-vectors ~u and ~v,
Output: determine whether ~u ≡Ga ~v.
We shall say that a set L of formulas in our language is a logic iff L contains all propositional
tautologies and L is closed under modus ponens (i.e. if φ ∈ L and φ→ ψ ∈ L then ψ ∈ L). A
logic L is said to be normal iff L contains all formulas of the form Ka(φ→ ψ)→ (Kaφ→
Kaψ) and L is closed under generalization (i.e. if φ ∈ L then Kaφ ∈ L). Let Lmin be the
least normal logic in our language that contains the following formulas as proper axioms:
Ax1: ((a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a)↔ (b⊲c↔ c⊲¯b))→ (a⊲c↔ c⊲¯a),
Ax2: ¬(a⊲b↔ a⊲¯c) ∨ ¬(b⊲c↔ b⊲¯a),
Ax3: Kaa⊲b ∨Kaa⊲¯b,
Ax4: a⊲b→ Kab⊲c ∨Kab⊲¯c,
Ax5: χ~u → Kˆaχ~v where G is a finite group of agents, a ∈ G is an agent and ~u and ~v are
G-vectors such that ~u ≡Ga ~v,
Ax6: Kaφ→ φ.
Let us remind that in atomic sentences like a⊲b, a, b are distinct. It follows that in dimension
1, a⊲b↔ b⊲¯a and a⊲b↔ a⊲¯c can be read as “a and b look into the same direction” and “a is
between b and c”. There are several points worth making about our proper axioms: Ax1 says
that if a and b look into the same direction iff b and c look into the same direction then a and
c look into the same direction; Ax2 says that a is not betwen b and c, or b is not between c
and a; Ax3 says that a knows whether it looks at b; Ax4 says that if a looks at b then a knows
whether b looks at c; Ax5 says that what is compatible with what a currently sees is also
compatible with what a currently knows; Ax6 says that what a knows is true. Note that we
have no need, as proper axioms, of the traditional formulas of positive introspection (Kaφ→
KaKaφ) and negative introspection (¬Kaφ → Ka¬Kaφ). Seeing that these formulas are
valid in W1s , the completeness result described below in Proposition 4.16 implies that they
are derivable from the proper axioms.
4.2 Completeness
We show first that
PROPOSITION 4.6
Let φ be a formula. If φ is in Lmin then W
1
s val
1 φ.
PROOF. It is readily seen that Ax1–Ax6 are valid in W
1
s .
Slightly less trivial is the following
PROPOSITION 4.7
Let φ be a formula. If for all linear orders T without endpoints, WTs val
T φ then φ is in
Lmin.
Proposition 4.7 will be proved by a construction similar to the canonical model construction.
Let n be a positive integer. As usual, any Lmin-consistent set of formulas can be extended to
an n-maximal Lmin-consistent set of formulas.
LEMMA 4.8
If Σ is an Lmin-consistent set of formulas then there exists an n-maximal Lmin-consistent
set ∆ of formulas such that Σ ⊆∆.
Let Z⋆ be the set of all non-zero integers. We will interpret n-formulas in the linear order T
= (T,≺) defined as follows:
• T = Z⋆ ∪ {(0, k): k ≤ n is a positive integer},
• for all α, β ∈ T , α ≺ β iff one of the following conditions hold:
– α, β ∈ Z⋆ and α < β,
– α ∈ Z⋆, there exists a positive integer j ≤ n such that β = (0, j) and α < 0,
– there exists a positive integer i ≤ n such that α = (0, i), β ∈ Z⋆ and 0 < β,
– there exists positive integers i, j ≤ n such that α = (0, i), β = (0, j) and i < j.
It follows immediately from the definition that
FACT 4.9
T is a linear order without endpoints.
Let Σ be an n-maximal Lmin-consistent set of formulas. For all positive integers k ≤ n, k is
said to be Σ-right iff k = 1, or k 6= 1 and (a1⊲ak ↔ ak⊲¯a1) ∈ Σ and k is said to be Σ-left iff
k 6= 1 and (a1⊲ak ↔ ak⊲a1) ∈ Σ. The reader may easily verify that to be Σ-right and to be
Σ-left are complementary properties of a positive integer k ≤ n. For all positive integers i, j
≤ n, we shall say that i Σ-precedes j iff i 6= j and one of the following conditions holds:
• i is Σ-right and ai⊲aj ∈ Σ,
• j is Σ-left and aj⊲ai ∈ Σ,
• i is Σ-left, j is Σ-right, ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ and aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ.
It is worth noting at this point the following
FACT 4.10
Let i, j, k ≤ n be positive integers.
1. i does not Σ-precede i.
2. If i Σ-precedes j and j Σ-precedes k then i Σ-precedes k.
3. If i 6= j then i Σ-precedes j, or j Σ-precedes i.
As a result, there exists permutations πrΣ, π
l
Σ of the set of all positive integers k ≤ n such that
for all positive integers i, j ≤ n,
• πrΣ(i) < π
r
Σ(j) iff i Σ-precedes j,
• πlΣ(i) < π
l
Σ(j) iff j Σ-precedes i.
Obviously, for all positive integers k ≤ n, πrΣ(k)+π
l
Σ(k) = n+1. We now wish to show that
there exists a simple T -world u such that for all formulas φ(a1, . . . , an), if φ(a1, . . . , an) ∈
Σ then WTs , u |=
T φ(a1, . . . , an). Let u
r
Σ, u
l
Σ be simple T -worlds such that for all positive
integers k ≤ n,
• xurΣ(ak) = (0, π
r
Σ(k)),
• if k is Σ-right then SurΣ(ak) = ](0, π
r
Σ(k)),+∞[,
• if k is Σ-left then SurΣ(ak) = ]−∞, (0, π
r
Σ(k))[,
• xulΣ(ak) = (0, π
l
Σ(k)),
• if k is Σ-right then SulΣ(ak) = ]−∞, (0, π
l
Σ(k))[,
• if k is Σ-left then SulΣ(ak) = ](0, π
l
Σ(k)),+∞[.
Remind that Z⋆n is the restriction to W
T
s of the least equivalence relation on W
1
s ∪ W
T
s
containing Zn. It follows immediately from the definition that
FACT 4.11
urΣ Z
⋆
n u
l
Σ .
Not surprisingly, we have
FACT 4.12
For all positive integers i, j ≤ n, if i 6= j then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T ai⊲aj .
2. WTs , u
l
Σ |=
T ai⊲aj .
3. ai⊲aj ∈ Σ.
For all positive integers i ≤ n, let ≡Tai be the indiscernibility relation between T -worlds
defined as in Section 2.3. The following fact is basic.
FACT 4.13
Let ∆ be an n-maximal consistent set of formulas. For all positive integers i≤ n, the follow-
ing conditions are equivalent:
1. urΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
r
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆.
2. ulΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
l
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆.
An important further result is
FACT 4.14
Let ∆ be an n-maximal consistent set of formulas. For all positive integers i ≤ n, if KaiΣ ⊆
∆ then
• urΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
r
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆,
• ulΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
l
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆.
With this established, the rest is easy.
FACT 4.15
Let ψ(a1, . . . , an) be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T ψ(a1, . . . , an).
2. WTs , u
l
Σ |=
T ψ(a1, . . . , an).
3. ψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Σ.
The proof of Proposition 4.7 can now be done as follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.7. Let n be a nonnegative integer such that φ is a formula whose
agents form a sublist of a1, . . . , an. Suppose φ(a1, . . . , an) is an Lmin-consistent formula.
Hence, by Lemma 4.8, there exists an n-maximal Lmin-consistent set Σ of formulas such
that φ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Σ. Thus, by Fact 4.15, W
T
s , uΣ |=
T φ(a1, . . . , an).
As a result,
PROPOSITION 4.16
Let φ be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. φ is in Lmin.
2. W1s val
1 φ.
3. There exists a linear order T without endpoints such that WTs val
T φ.
4. For all linear orders T without endpoints, WTs val
T φ.
PROOF. By Proposition 3.5, it suffices to prove that 1.⇒2. and 4.⇒1.
1.⇒2. By Proposition 4.6.
4.⇒1. By Proposition 4.7.
5 Decidability and complexity of model checking problems
In this section, for some positive integers k, we investigate the decidability and complexity
of the model checking problem with respect to Wks : given a k-world u in W
k
s and a for-
mula φ, determine whether Wks , u |=
k φ. The results obtained are summarized as follows:
PSPACE-complete when k = 1 and PSPACE-hard and in EXPSPACE when k = 2.
Let us remind that in the more traditional epistemic logics considered in [11, 12], for example,
model checking problems are usually decidable in deterministic polynomial time.
5.1 In dimension 1
First, we prove the following
LEMMA 5.1
The validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the model checking problem
with respect to W1s .
As a result,
PROPOSITION 5.2
The model checking problem with respect to W1s is PSPACE-complete.
PROOF. PSPACE-hardness follows from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 5.1. Membership
in PSPACE follows from Chandra et al. [7], Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 and the fact that the fol-
lowing alternating algorithm (where without loss of generality, we assume that (u(a1), . . . ,
u(an)) is coded as a G-vector with G= {a1, . . . , an}) decides in polynomial time the model
checking problem with respect to W1s :
algorithm mc1((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), φ(a1, . . . , an))
begin
case φ(a1, . . . , an) of
begin
ai⊲aj : (·) if ai sees aj in (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) then succeed else fail
⊥: (·) fail
¬ψ(a1, . . . , an): (·)
begin
call mc1((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), ψ(a1, . . . , an))
if this call succeeds then fail else succeed
end
ψ1(a1, . . . , an) ∨ ψ2(a1, . . . , an): (∃)
begin
choose i in {1, 2}
call mc1((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), ψi(a1, . . . , an))
if this call succeeds then succeed else fail
end
Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an): (∀)
begin
choose a G-vector (v(a1), . . . , v(an)) such that (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) ≡
G
ai
(v(a1), . . . , v(an))
call mc1((v(a1), . . . , v(an)), ψ(a1, . . . , an))
if this call succeeds then succeed else fail
end
end
end
Its execution depends primarily on φ(a1, . . . , an), each case being existential, or universal.
For example, the case ((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), ψ1(a1, . . . , an) ∨ ψ2(a1, . . . , an)) is existential.
It is an accepting case iff for some i ∈ {1, 2}, the case ((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), ψi(a1, . . . , an))
is accepting, thus corresponding to the fact that ψ1(a1, . . . , an) ∨ ψ2(a1, . . . , an) is true for
(u(a1), . . . , u(an)) iff for some i ∈ {1, 2}, ψi(a1, . . . , an) is true for (u(a1), . . . , u(an)). As
well, the case ((u(a1), . . . , u(an)),Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an)) is universal. It is an accepting case iff
for every G-vector (v(a1), . . . , v(an)) such that (u(a1), . . . , u(an))≡
G
ai
(v(a1), . . . , v(an)),
the case ((v(a1), . . . , v(an)), ψ(a1, . . . , an)) is accepting, thus corresponding to the fact that
Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) is true for (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) iff for every G-vector (v(a1), . . . , v(an))
such that (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) ≡
G
ai
(v(a1), . . . , v(an)), ψ(a1, . . . , an) is true for (v(a1), . . . ,
v(an)). Cases labelled with (·) are both existential and universal. All in all, it is clear that
mc1((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), φ(a1, . . . , an)) correctly solves the model checking problem with
respect to W1s and that it can be implemented in a polynomial time-bounded alternating Tur-
ing machine. Hence, the model checking problem with respect to W1s is in PSPACE.
5.2 In dimension 2
First, we prove the following
LEMMA 5.3
The validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the model checking problem
with respect to W2s .
As a result,
PROPOSITION 5.4
The model checking problem with respect to W2s is PSPACE-hard and in EXPSPACE.
PROOF. PSPACE-hardness follows from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 5.3. A general strat-
egy for proving a decision problem to be in EXPSPACE is to reduce it to a decision prob-
lem already known to be in EXPSPACE. A suitable decision problem already known to
be in EXPSPACE is the validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra [4]. The lan-
guage of elementary algebra is a first-order language with equality. It consists of the constant
symbols 0 and 1, the function symbols + and× of arity 2 and the relation symbol< of arity 2.
Suppose that we are given a 2-world (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) inW
2
s and a formula φ(a1, . . . , an).
We shall construct a sentence ϕ((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), φ(a1, . . . , an)) in elementary algebra
such that φ(a1, . . . , an) is true for (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) inW
2
s iff ϕ((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), φ(a1,
. . . , an)) is valid. Choose distinct individual variables x
α
k , y
α
k where k ≤ n is a positive
integer and α is a nonnegative integer. For all positive integers k ≤ n, x0k, x
1
k, . . . and
y0k, y
1
k, . . . will represent the abscissas and the ordinates of the positions in R
2 occupied by
ak in such-and-such 2-world. Choose distinct individual variables z
α
k , t
α
k where k ≤ n is a
positive integer and α is a nonnegative integer. For all positive integers k ≤ n, z0k, z
1
k, . . .
and t0k, t
1
k, . . . will represent the coordinates of the endpoints in R
2 of the vectors located at
the origin corresponding to the sections seen by ak in such-and-such 2-world. Without loss
of generality, let us assume that the 2-world (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) in W
2
s is given by means of
rational numbers rx01 , ry01 , . . . , rx0n , ry0n , rz01 , rt01 , . . . , rz0n , rt0n corresponding to the abscissas
and the ordinates of the positions in R2 occupied by a1, . . . , an and the coordinates of the
endpoints in R2 of the vectors located at the origin corresponding to the sections seen by
a1, . . . , an. Rational numbers being easily definable in the language of elementary algebra,
there exists a formula ϕu(x
0
1, y
0
1 , . . . , x
0
n, y
0
n, z
0
1 , t
0
1, . . . , z
0
n, t
0
n) with free individual variables
x01, y
0
1 , . . . , x
0
n, y
0
n, z
0
1 , t
0
1, . . . , z
0
n, t
0
n in elementary algebra such that the following conditions
are equivalent:
• the formula ϕu(x
0
1, y
0
1 , . . . , x
0
n, y
0
n, z
0
1 , t
0
1, . . . , z
0
n, t
0
n) holds for the real numbers vx01 , vy01 ,
. . . , vx0n , vy0n , vz01 , vt01 , . . . , vz0n , vt0n ,
• vx01 = rx01 , vy01 = ry01 , . . ., vx0n = rx0n , vy0n = ry0n , vz01 = rz01 , vt01 = rt01 , . . ., vz0n = rz0n ,
vt0n = rt0n .
For all positive integers i, j ≤ n and for all nonnegative integers α, let sees(xαi , y
α
i , z
α
i , t
α
i ,
xαj , y
α
j ) be a formula with free individual variables x
α
i , y
α
i , z
α
i , t
α
i , x
α
j , y
α
j in elementary alge-
bra such that the following conditions are equivalent:
• the formula sees(xαi , y
α
i , z
α
i , t
α
i , x
α
j , y
α
j ) holds for the real numbers vxαi , vyαi , vzαi , vtαi ,
vxα
j
, vyα
j
,
• an agent occupying the position in R2 defined by (vxα
i
, vyα
i
) and seeing the section in R2
defined by (vzα
i
, vtα
i
) sees an agent occupying the position in R2 defined by (vxα
j
, vyα
j
).
For all positive integers i ≤ n and for all nonnegative integers α, let equivi(x
α
1 , y
α
1 , . . . , x
α
n,
yαn , z
α
1 , t
α
1 , . . . , z
α
n , t
α
n, x
α+1
1 , y
α+1
1 , . . . , x
α+1
n , y
α+1
n , z
α+1
1 , t
α+1
1 , . . . , z
α+1
n , t
α+1
n ) be a
formula with free individual variables xα1 , y
α
1 , . . . , x
α
n, y
α
n , z
α
1 , t
α
1 , . . . , z
α
n , t
α
n, x
α+1
1 , y
α+1
1 ,
. . . , xα+1n , y
α+1
n , z
α+1
1 , t
α+1
1 , . . . , z
α+1
n , t
α+1
n in elementary algebra such that the following
conditions are equivalent:
• the formula equivi(x
α
1 , y
α
1 , . . . , x
α
n, y
α
n , z
α
1 , t
α
1 , . . . , z
α
n , t
α
n, x
α+1
1 , y
α+1
1 , . . . , x
α+1
n , y
α+1
n ,
zα+11 , t
α+1
1 , . . . , z
α+1
n , t
α+1
n ) holds for the real numbers vxα1 , vyα1 , . . . , vxαn , vyαn , vzα1 , vtα1 ,
. . . , vzαn , vtαn , vxα+11
, vyα+11
, . . . , vxα+1n , vyα+1n , vzα+11
, vtα+11
, . . . , vzα+1n , vtα+1n ,
• the 2-worlds defined by vxα1 , vyα1 , . . . , vxαn , vyαn , vzα1 , vtα1 , . . . , vzαn , vtαn and vxα+11
, vyα+11
,
. . . , vxα+1n , vyα+1n , vzα+11
, vtα+11
, . . . , vzα+1n , vtα+1n are indiscernible for ai.
The translation τ taking nonnegative integers and formulas to formulas in elementary algebra
is defined as follows:
• τ(α, ai⊲aj) = sees(x
α
i , y
α
i , z
α
i , t
α
i , x
α
j , y
α
j ),
• τ(α,⊥) = ⊥,
• τ(α,¬φ) = ¬τ(α, φ),
• τ(α, φ ∨ ψ) = τ(α, φ) ∨ τ(α,ψ),
• τ(α,Kaiφ) = ∀x
α+1
1 ∀y
α+1
1 . . .∀x
α+1
n ∀y
α+1
n ∀z
α+1
1 ∀t
α+1
1 . . .∀z
α+1
n ∀t
α+1
n (equivi(x
α
1 ,
yα1 , . . . , x
α
n, y
α
n , z
α
1 , t
α
1 , . . . , z
α
n , t
α
n, x
α+1
1 , y
α+1
1 , . . . , x
α+1
n , y
α+1
n , z
α+1
1 , t
α+1
1 , . . . , z
α+1
n ,
tα+1n )→ τ(α+ 1, φ)).
Let ϕ((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), φ(a1, . . . , an)) be ∀x
0
1∀y
0
1 . . .∀x
0
n∀y
0
n∀z
0
1∀t
0
1 . . .∀z
0
n∀t
0
n(ϕu(x
0
1,
y01 , . . . , x
0
n, y
0
n, z
0
1 , t
0
1, . . . , z
0
n, t
0
n) → τ(0, φ(a1, . . . , an))). Remark that ϕ((u(a1), . . . ,
u(an)), φ(a1, . . . , an)) can be computed in logarithmic space. Moreover, the reader may eas-
ily verify that φ(a1, . . . , an) is true for (u(a1), . . . , u(an)) in W
2
s iff ϕ((u(a1), . . . , u(an)),
φ(a1, . . . , an)) is valid. Thus, the model checking problem with respect to W
2
s is reducible
to the validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra.
6 Decidability and complexity of satisfiability problems
In this section, for some positive integers k, we investigate the decidability and complexity
of the satisfiability problem with respect to Wks : given a formula φ, determine whether W
k
s
satk φ. The results obtained are summarized as follows: PSPACE-complete when k =
1 and PSPACE-hard and in EXPSPACE when k = 2. Let us remind that in the more
traditional epistemic logics considered in [11, 12], for example, satisfiability problems are
usually decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time or in polynomial space, according as
there exists only one agent or there exists at least two agents.
6.1 In dimension 1
First, we prove the following
LEMMA 6.1
The validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the satisfiability problem
with respect to W1s .
As a result,
PROPOSITION 6.2
The satisfiability problem with respect to W1s is PSPACE-complete.
PROOF. PSPACE-hardness follows from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 6.1. Membership
in PSPACE follows from Savitch [17], Proposition 3.4 and the fact that the following non-
deterministic algorithm decides in polynomial space the satisfiability problem with respect to
W1s :
algorithm sat1(φ(a1, . . . , an))
begin
choose a G-vector (u(a1), . . . , u(an))
call mc1PSPACE((u(a1), . . . , u(an)), φ(a1, . . . , an))
if this call succeeds then succeed else fail
end
where mc1PSPACE is a deterministic algorithm that decides in polynomial space the model
checking problem with respect to W1s (by Proposition 5.2, we know that there exists such
algorithms). It is clear that sat1 correctly solves the satisfiability problem with respect to
W1s and that it can be implemented in a polynomial space-bounded nondeterministic Turing
machine. Hence, the satisfiability problem with respect to W1s is in PSPACE.
6.2 In dimension 2
First, we prove the following
LEMMA 6.3
The validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the satisfiability problem
with respect to W2s .
As a result,
PROPOSITION 6.4
The satisfiability problem with respect to W2s is PSPACE-hard and in EXPSPACE.
PROOF. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.4. PSPACE-hardness follows
from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 6.3. Membership in EXPSPACE follows from Ben-Or
et al. [4] and the fact that the satisfiability problem with respect to W2s is reducible to the
validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra. Suppose that we are given a formula
φ(a1, . . . , an). We shall construct a sentence ϕ(φ(a1, . . . , an)) in elementary algebra such
that φ(a1, . . . , an) is satisfiable in W
2
s iff ϕ(φ(a1, . . . , an)) is valid. Choose distinct individ-
ual variables xαk , y
α
k where k ≤ n is a positive integer and α is a nonnegative integer, choose
distinct individual variables zαk , t
α
k where k ≤ n is a positive integer and α is a nonneg-
ative integer and let ϕu(x
0
1, y
0
1 , . . . , x
0
n, y
0
n, z
0
1 , t
0
1, . . . , z
0
n, t
0
n), sees(x
α
i , y
α
i , z
α
i , t
α
i , x
α
j , y
α
j )
and equivi(x
α
1 , y
α
1 , . . . , x
α
n, y
α
n , z
α
1 , t
α
1 , . . . , z
α
n , t
α
n, x
α+1
1 , y
α+1
1 , . . . , x
α+1
n , y
α+1
n , z
α+1
1 ,
tα+11 , . . . , z
α+1
n , t
α+1
n ) be the formulas in elementary algebra defined in the proof of Propo-
sition 5.4. Let τ be the translation taking nonnegative integers and formulas to formu-
las in elementary algebra defined in the proof of Proposition 5.4. Let ϕ(φ(a1, . . . , an))
be ∃x01∃y
0
1 . . .∃x
0
n∃y
0
n∃z
0
1∃t
0
1 . . .∃z
0
n∃t
0
nτ(0, φ(a1, . . . , an)). Remark thatϕ(φ(a1, . . . , an))
can be computed in logarithmic space. Moreover, the reader may easily verify that φ(a1, . . . ,
an) is satisfiable in W
2
s iff ϕ(φ(a1, . . . , an)) is valid. Thus, the satisfiability problem with
respect to W2s is reducible to the validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra.
7 Variants
In this section, we discuss several variants not captured by the syntax and the semantics
considered in Sections 2–6. For most of them, the axiomatization/completeness issue and the
decidability/complexity issue are still unsettled.
7.1 Group knowledge
There exists various notions of what may be called group knowledge. A well-known example
of such a notion of knowledge for a group of agents is the following: CGφ (“φ is common
knowledge in the group G”). The usual semantics definition of common knowledge runs as
follows within the context ofWns : W
n
s , u |=
n CGφ iff for all n-worlds v inW
n
s , if u
⋃+
{≡na :
a ∈ G} v then Wns , v |=
n φ,
⋃+
{≡na : a ∈ G} denoting the transitive closure of the union
of the indiscernibility relations concerning agents in group G. In this respect, see [12] for
details, the key valid principles of common knowledge are
• CGφ→
∧
{Ka(φ ∧ CGφ): a ∈ G},
• CG(φ→
∧
{Kaφ: a ∈ G})→
∧
{Ka(φ→ CGφ): a ∈ G}.
However, W1s invalidates very specific formulas. For instance, choose distinct agents a1, a2,
a3, b, c. The reader may easily verify that W
1
s inv
1 K{a1,a2,a3}b⊲c. Another interesting
example of such a notion of knowledge for a group of agents is the following: DGφ (“φ
is distributed knowledge in the group G”). The usual semantics definition of distributed
knowledge runs as follows within the context of Wns : W
n
s , u |=
n DGφ iff for all n-worlds v
in Wns , if u
⋂
{≡na : a ∈ G} v then W
n
s , v |=
n φ,
⋂
{≡na : a ∈ G} denoting the intersection
of the indiscernibility relations concerning agents in group G. In this respect, see [12] for
details, the key valid principle of distributed knowledge is
• DGφ→
∧
{Kaφ: a ∈ G}.
Nevertheless,W1s validates formulas that are not valid in a more general setting. For example,
choose a finite group G of agents. The reader may easily verify that for all formulas φ(G),
W1s val
1 DGφ(G)↔ φ(G).
7.2 Announcements
We have considered in Sections 2–6 that the knowledge our agents have about their environ-
ment mostly depends on the positions they occupy and the sections they see. The truth is
that knowledge is also affected by the messages our agents exchange. Following the intuition
behind the logic of public announcements, see [10] for an introduction, for all formulas ϕ, let
us add modal operators of the form [ϕ] (“after announcement of ϕ, it holds that . . .”) to our
language. As usual, for all formulas ϕ, we define the modal operator 〈ϕ〉 as follows:
• 〈ϕ〉φ ::= ¬[ϕ]¬φ.
Within the context of a nonempty set Wn of n-worlds, Wn|ϕ being the set of all n-worlds v in
Wn such that Wn, v |=n ϕ, n-satisfaction of [ϕ]φ is defined by
• Wn, u |=n [ϕ]φ iff if Wn, u |=n ϕ then Wn|ϕ, |=
n φ.
As a result,
• Wn, u |=n 〈ϕ〉φ iff Wn, u |=n ϕ and Wn|ϕ, |=
n φ.
See [19] for a study of this variant. This variant is interesting because it can be considered
as a logic of public communications between agents that look at one another, formulas like
[Kaϕ]φ and 〈Kaϕ〉φ being read “if a knows that ϕ then after the announcement of ϕ by a, φ
holds” and “a knows that ϕ and after the announcement of ϕ by a, φ holds”.
7.3 Visual abilities
We have considered in Sections 2–6 that our agents had similar visual abilities. What happens
if agents’ sights vary? In Section 2.2, for all positive integers n, we have defined n-worlds
as functions assigning n-scopes to agents. If the visual abilities of our agents are similar to
those of a radar then the n-scopes assigned to agents can be classed as open n-discs of such-
and-such diameter. We shall say that an n-scope (x, S) is circular iff S is an open n-disc and
x is the center of S.
EXAMPLE 7.1
If one considers Figure 14 in dimension 2, a 2-scope is defined by the point and the open
2-disc delimited by the circle.
An n-world u is said to be circular iff for all agents a, the n-scope u(a) is circular. Let
Wnc be the set of all circular n-worlds. Choose distinct agents a, b, c. The reader may easily
✉
✫✪
✬✩
R2
FIG. 14. A circular 2-scope.
verify that W1s val
1 a⊲b ∧ b⊲a → a⊲c ∨ b⊲c and W1c fal
1 a⊲b ∧ b⊲a → a⊲c ∨ b⊲c. Hence,
our language can distinguish between the notion of satisfiability in W1s and the notion of
satisfiability in W1c . We have considered in Sections 2–6 that the knowledge our agents have
about their environment mostly depends on the positions they occupy and the sections they
see. The truth is that knowledge is also affected by the amount of effort our agents put in.
Following the intuition behind the logic of subset spaces, see [15] for an introduction, let us
add modal operators of the form ✷a (“whatever the effort a puts in, . . .”) to our language. As
usual, for all agents a, we define the modal operator ✸a as follows:
• ✸aφ ::= ¬✷a¬φ.
We shall say that agent a has sharpened its range of vision between n-scopes u and v iff the
only difference between u and v lies in the fact that Su(a)  Sv(a). Within the context of
Wnc , n-satisfaction of ✷aφ is defined by
• Wnc , u |=
n
✷aφ iff for all n-worlds v in W
n
c , if a has sharpened its range of vision
between u and v then Wnc , v |=
n φ.
As a result,
• Wnc , u |=
n
✸aφ iff there exists an n-world v in W
n
c such that a has sharpened its range
of vision between u and v and Wnc , v |=
n φ.
We first observe that Wnc val
n
✷aφ → φ, W
n
c val
n
✷aφ → ✷a✷aφ and W
n
c val
n
✸aφ ∧
✸aψ → ✸a(φ ∧ ✸aψ) ∨ ✸a(✸aφ ∧ ψ). In other respects, for all ✷·-free formulas φ, W
n
c
valn ✷aKˆaφ → ✸aKaφ. Let us consider an enumeration a0, a1, . . . of AGT . Consider a
nonnegative integers i ≤ n. Let φ⊲i be the conjunction of the following literals:
• for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i 6= j then ai⊲aj .
Let φ⊲¯i be the conjunction of the following literals:
• for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i 6= j then ai⊲¯aj .
Let φi be φ
⊲¯
i ∧ ✷aiφ
⊲
i . φi says that: for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i 6= j then ai does
not see aj ; whatever the effort ai puts in, for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i 6= j then ai
sees aj . As a result, φi implies that for all nonnegative integers j, k ≤ n, if i 6= j and i 6= k
then the distance between the positions of ai and aj and the distance between the positions of
ai and ak are equal. Let φ be φ0∧ . . .∧φn. The reader may easily verify thatW
n
c inv
n φ and
Wn+1c sat
n+1 φ. Hence, our language can distinguish between the notion of satisfiability in
Wnc and the notion of satisfiability in W
n+1
c .
8 Conclusion
This article considered a logic for studying knowledge of agents where sentences like “a
knows that b sees c” can be expressed. We have studied its expressivity, axiomatized validity
in W1s and investigated the complexity of the model checking and satisfiability problems
in W1s and W
2
s . Much remains to be done. Firstly, there is the problem of the complete
axiomatization of validity in W2s . Secondly, there is the question of the precise complexity
of the model checking and satisfiability problems in W2s . Thirdly, there is the issue of the
variants considered in Section 7. Of course, one could as well formulate these problems,
questions and issues in dimensions n ≥ 3.
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Annex
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1. By induction on φ(a1, . . . , ak). The argument is similar to that
given in Blackburn et al. [5, Theorem 2.20], as the reader should check.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.3. Let u(1) be a simple 1-world and u(T ) be a simple T -world such
that u(1) Zk u
(T ).
1. Let i, j ≤ k be positive integers such that ai sees aj in u
(1). Since u(1) Zk u
(T ), then
ai sees aj in u
(T ).
2. Let i, j ≤ k be positive integers such that ai sees aj in u
(T ). Since u(1) Zk u
(T ), then ai
sees aj in u
(1).
3. Let i ≤ k be a positive integer and v(1) be a simple 1-world such that u(1) ≡1ai v
(1).
Consider the set of all simple T -worlds v(T ) such that xu(T )(ai) = xv(T )(ai), Su(T )(ai) =
Sv(T )(ai) and for all positive integers j ≤ k, if ai sees aj in u
(T ) then xu(T )(aj) = xv(T )(aj)
and Su(T )(aj) = Sv(T )(aj). Since T is a linear order without endpoints, then this set contains
a simple T -world v(T ) such that, j1, . . . , jl being a list of all the positive integers j ≤ k such
that ai does not see aj in u
(T ), the temporal relationships between aj1 , . . . , ajl in v
(1) are
equal to the temporal relationships between aj1 , . . . , ajl in v
(T ). Since u(1) Zk u
(T ), then
u(T ) ≡Tai v
(T ) and v(1) Zk v
(T ).
4. Let i ≤ k be a positive integer and v(T ) be a simple T -world such that u(T ) ≡Tai v
(T ).
Consider the set of all simple 1-worlds v(1) such that xu(1)(ai) = xv(1)(ai), Su(1)(ai) =
Sv(1)(ai) and for all positive integers j ≤ k, if ai sees aj in u
(1) then xu(1)(aj) = xv(1)(aj)
and Su(1)(aj) = Sv(1)(aj). Since R is a linear order without endpoints, then this set contains
a simple 1-world v(1) such that, j1, . . . , jl being a list of all the positive integers j ≤ k such
that ai does not see aj in u
(1), the temporal relationships between aj1 , . . . , ajl in v
(1) are
equal to the temporal relationships between aj1 , . . . , ajl in v
(T ). Since u(1) Zk u
(T ), then
u(1) ≡1ai v
(1) and v(1) Zk v
(T ).
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.5. Obvious.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.8. The argument is similar to that given in Blackburn et al. [5, Lemma
4.21], as the reader should check.
PROOF OF FACT 4.9. Obvious.
PROOF OF FACT 4.10. 1. Obvious.
2. Suppose i Σ-precedes j, j Σ-precedes k and i does not Σ-precede k. Since i Σ-precedes
j, then i 6= j and
• (1) i is Σ-right and ai⊲aj ∈ Σ, or (2) j is Σ-left and aj⊲ai ∈ Σ, or (3) i is Σ-left, j is
Σ-right, ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ and aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ.
Since j Σ-precedes k, then j 6= k and
• (4) j is Σ-right and aj⊲ak ∈ Σ, or (5) k is Σ-left and ak⊲aj ∈ Σ, or (6) j is Σ-left, k is
Σ-right, aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ and ak⊲¯aj ∈ Σ.
Since i does not Σ-precede k, then i = k, or i 6= k and
• (7) i is not Σ-right, or (8) ai⊲ak 6∈ Σ,
• (9) k is not Σ-left, or (10) ak⊲ai 6∈ Σ,
• (11) i is not Σ-left, or (12) k is not Σ-right, or (13) ai⊲¯ak 6∈ Σ, or (14) ak⊲¯ai 6∈ Σ.
Hence, we have to consider eighteen cases.
Case “(1), (4) and i = k”. Since (1), then i is Σ-right and ai⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since (4), then j
is Σ-right and aj⊲ak ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then aj⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since i 6= j, then (ai⊲aj ↔ aj ⊲¯ai)
∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and j is Σ-right). Since ai⊲aj ∈ Σ, then
aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(1), (4), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (1),
then i is Σ-right and ai⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since (4), then j is Σ-right and aj⊲ak ∈ Σ. Since (7), or
(8), then i is not Σ-right, or ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ. Since i is Σ-right, then ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ. Since i 6= j, then
(ai⊲aj ↔ aj ⊲¯ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and j is Σ-right). Since
ai⊲aj ∈ Σ, then aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since ai⊲aj ∈ Σ and aj⊲ak ∈ Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or aj⊲ai ∈ Σ
(use axiom Ax2). Since aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(1), (5) and i = k”. Since (1), then i is Σ-right. Since (5), then k is Σ-left. Since i =
k, then i is Σ-left: a contradiction.
Case “(1), (5), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (1),
then i is Σ-right and ai⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since (5), then k is Σ-left and ak⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since (7), or
(8), then i is not Σ-right, or ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ. Since (9), or (10), then k is not Σ-left, or ak⊲¯ai ∈
Σ. Since i is Σ-right and k is Σ-left, then ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ and ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since ai⊲aj ∈ Σ and
ak⊲aj ∈ Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax2). Since ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ, then ak⊲ai ∈
Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(1), (6) and i = k”. Since (1), then ai⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since (6), then ak⊲¯aj ∈ Σ. Since
i = k, then ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(1), (6), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (1),
then i is Σ-right and ai⊲aj ∈Σ. Since (6), then j is Σ-left, k is Σ-right, aj ⊲¯ak ∈Σ and ak⊲¯aj
∈ Σ. Since (7), or (8), then i is not Σ-right, or ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ. Since i is Σ-right, then ai⊲¯ak ∈
Σ. Since i 6= j, then (ai⊲aj ↔ aj⊲ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and
j is Σ-left). Since ai⊲aj ∈ Σ, then aj⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since i 6= k, then (ai⊲ak ↔ ak⊲¯ai) ∈ Σ (use
axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and k is Σ-right). Since ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ, then ak⊲ai ∈ Σ.
Since ai⊲aj ∈ Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲aj ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax2). Since ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ, then
ak⊲aj ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(2), (4) and i = k”. Since (2), then j is Σ-left. Since (4), then j is Σ-right: a
contradiction.
Case “(2), (4), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (2),
then j is Σ-left. Since (4), then j is Σ-right: a contradiction.
Case “(2), (5) and i = k”. Since (2), then j is Σ-left and aj⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since (5), then k
is Σ-left and ak⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then i is Σ-left and ai⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since i 6= j, then
(ai⊲aj ↔ aj ⊲¯ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-left and j is Σ-left). Since
aj⊲ai ∈ Σ, then ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(2), (5), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (2),
then j is Σ-left and aj⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since (5), then k is Σ-left and ak⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since (9), or (10),
then k is not Σ-left, or ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since k is Σ-left, then ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since j 6= k, then
(aj⊲ak ↔ ak⊲¯aj) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that j is Σ-left and k is Σ-left). Since
ak⊲aj ∈ Σ, then aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ. Since ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ, then aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ, or ak⊲¯aj ∈ Σ (use axiom
Ax2). Since aj⊲ai ∈ Σ, then ak⊲¯aj ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(2), (6) and i = k”. Since (2), then aj⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since (6), then aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ. Since
i = k, then aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(2), (6), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (2),
then j is Σ-left and aj⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since (6), then j is Σ-left, k is Σ-right, aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ and ak⊲¯aj
∈ Σ. Since (7), or (8), then i is not Σ-right, or ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ. Since (11), or (12), or (13), or (14),
then i is not Σ-left, or k is not Σ-right, or ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai ∈ Σ. Suppose i is Σ-right.
Since i is not Σ-right, or ai⊲¯ak ∈Σ, then ai⊲¯ak ∈Σ. Since i 6= k, then (ai⊲ak ↔ ak⊲¯ai) ∈Σ
(use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and k is Σ-right). Since ai⊲¯ak ∈ Σ, then ak⊲ai
∈ Σ. Since aj⊲ai ∈ Σ, then aj⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲aj ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax2). Since aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ,
then ak⊲aj ∈ Σ: a contradiction. Suppose i is Σ-left. Since i 6= k, then (ai⊲ak ↔ ak⊲ai) ∈
Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-left and k is Σ-right). Since i is Σ-left, k is Σ-right
and i is not Σ-left, or k is not Σ-right, or ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai ∈ Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai
∈ Σ. Since (ai⊲ak ↔ ak⊲ai) ∈ Σ, then ak⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since aj⊲ai ∈ Σ, then aj⊲ak ∈ Σ, or
ak⊲aj ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax2). Since aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ, then ak⊲aj ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(3), (4) and i = k”. Since (3), then aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since (4), then aj⊲ak ∈ Σ. Since
i = k, then aj⊲ai ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(3), (4), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (3),
then i is Σ-left, j is Σ-right, ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ and aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since (4), then j is Σ-right and aj⊲ak
∈ Σ. Since (9), or (10), then k is not Σ-left, or ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since (11), or (12), or (13), or
(14), then i is not Σ-left, or k is not Σ-right, or ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai ∈ Σ. Suppose k is
Σ-right. Since i is Σ-left and i is not Σ-left, or k is not Σ-right, or ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai ∈
Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai ∈ Σ. Since i 6= k, then (ai⊲ak ↔ ak⊲ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1
and the fact that i is Σ-left and k is Σ-right). Since ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲ai ∈ Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈
Σ. Since aj⊲ak ∈ Σ, then ai⊲aj ∈ Σ, or aj⊲ai ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax2). Since ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ, then
aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ: a contradiction. Suppose k is Σ-left. Since k is not Σ-left, or ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ, then
ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ, then aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲¯aj ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax2). Since j 6=
k, then (aj⊲ak ↔ ak⊲aj) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that j is Σ-right and k is Σ-left).
Since aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ, or ak⊲¯aj ∈ Σ, then aj ⊲¯ak ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(3), (5) and i = k”. Since (3), then ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ. Since (5), then ak⊲aj ∈ Σ. Since
i = k, then ai⊲aj ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(3), (5), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (3),
then i is Σ-left, j is Σ-right, ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ and aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since (5), then k is Σ-left and ak⊲aj
∈ Σ. Since (9), or (10), then k is not Σ-left, or ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Since k is Σ-left, then ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ.
Since i 6= k, then (ai⊲ak ↔ ak⊲¯ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-left and k
is Σ-left). Since ak⊲¯ai ∈ Σ, then ai⊲ak ∈ Σ. Since j 6= k, then (aj⊲ak ↔ ak⊲aj) ∈ Σ (use
axiom Ax1 and the fact that j is Σ-right and k is Σ-left). Since ak⊲aj ∈ Σ, then aj⊲ak ∈ Σ.
Since ai⊲ak ∈ Σ, then ai⊲aj ∈ Σ, or aj⊲ai ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax2). Since ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ, then
aj⊲ai ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “(3), (6) and i = k”. Since (3), then j is Σ-right. Since (6), then j is Σ-left: a
contradiction.
Case “(3), (6), i 6= k, (7), or (8), (9), or (10) and (11), or (12), or (13), or (14)”. Since (3),
then j is Σ-right. Since (6), then j is Σ-left: a contradiction.
3. Suppose i 6= j, i does not Σ-precede j and j does not Σ-precede i. Since i 6= j and i
does not Σ-precede j, then
• (1) i is not Σ-right, or (2) ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ,
• (3) j is not Σ-left, or (4) aj⊲ai 6∈ Σ,
• (5) i is not Σ-left, or (6) j is not Σ-right, or (7) ai⊲¯aj 6∈ Σ, or (8) aj ⊲¯ai 6∈ Σ.
Since i 6= j and j does not Σ-precede i, then
• (9) j is not Σ-right, or (10) aj⊲ai 6∈ Σ,
• (11) i is not Σ-left, or (12) ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ,
• (13) j is not Σ-left, or (14) i is not Σ-right, or (15) aj ⊲¯ai 6∈ Σ, or (16) ai⊲¯aj 6∈ Σ.
The 1st and 5th items imply conditions (2) and (12), i.e. ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ. The 2nd and 4th items
imply conditions (4) and (10), i.e. aj ⊲¯ai ∈ Σ. Thus, conditions (7), (8), (15) and (16) does
not hold. Therefore, the 3rd and 6th items imply i is Σ-right and j is Σ-right, or i is Σ-left
and j is Σ-left. Since i 6= j, then (ai⊲aj ↔ aj ⊲¯ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is
Σ-right and j is Σ-right, or i is Σ-left and j is Σ-left). Since ai⊲¯aj ∈ Σ, then aj⊲ai ∈ Σ: a
contradiction.
PROOF OF FACT 4.11. It suffices to note that for all positive integers i, j ≤ n, ai sees
aj in u
r
Σ iff ai sees aj in u
l
Σ.
PROOF OF FACT 4.12. By Fact 4.11, WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T ai⊲aj iff W
T
s , u
l
Σ |=
T ai⊲aj . Hence,
it suffices to demonstrate that WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T ai⊲aj iff ai⊲aj ∈ Σ.
Suppose WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T ai⊲aj and ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ. Since W
T
s , u
r
Σ |=
T ai⊲aj , then ai sees aj
in urΣ. Hence, SurΣ(ai) contains xurΣ(aj). Thus, i is Σ-right and ](0, π
r
Σ(i)),+∞[ contains
(0, πrΣ(j)), or i is Σ-left and ] −∞, (0, π
r
Σ(i))[ contains (0, π
r
Σ(j)). Therefore, we have to
consider two cases.
Case “i is Σ-right and ](0, πrΣ(i)),+∞[ contains (0, π
r
Σ(j))”. Since ](0, π
r
Σ(i)),+∞[ con-
tains (0, πrΣ(j)), then (0, π
r
Σ(i)) ≺ (0, π
r
Σ(j)). Hence, π
r
Σ(i) < π
r
Σ(j). Thus, i Σ-precedes j
and i 6= j. Since i Σ-precedes j, i is Σ-right and ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ, then j is Σ-left and aj⊲ai ∈ Σ.
Since i 6= j, then (ai⊲aj ↔ aj⊲ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and j is
Σ-left). Since ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ, then aj⊲ai 6∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “i is Σ-left and ]−∞, (0, πrΣ(i))[ contains (0, π
r
Σ(j))”. Since ]−∞, (0, π
r
Σ(i))[ con-
tains (0, πrΣ(j)), then (0, π
r
Σ(j)) ≺ (0, π
r
Σ(i)). Hence, π
r
Σ(j) < π
r
Σ(i). Thus, j Σ-precedes i
and i 6= j. Since j Σ-precedes i, i is Σ-left and ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ, then j is Σ-right and aj⊲ai ∈ Σ.
Since i 6= j, then (ai⊲aj ↔ aj⊲ai) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax1 and the fact that i is Σ-left and j is
Σ-right). Since ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ, then aj⊲ai 6∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Suppose ai⊲aj ∈ Σ and W
T
s , u
r
Σ 6|=
T ai⊲aj . Since W
T
s , u
r
Σ 6|=
T ai⊲aj , then ai does not see
aj in u
r
Σ. Hence, SurΣ(ai) does not contain xurΣ(aj). Thus, i is Σ-right and ](0, π
r
Σ(i)),+∞[
does not contain (0, πrΣ(j)), or i is Σ-left and ]−∞, (0, π
r
Σ(i))[ does not contain (0, π
r
Σ(j)).
Therefore, we have to consider two cases.
Case “i is Σ-right and ](0, πrΣ(i)),+∞[ does not contain (0, π
r
Σ(j))”. Since ](0, π
r
Σ(i)),
+∞[ does not contain (0, πrΣ(j)), then (0, π
r
Σ(i)) 6≺ (0, π
r
Σ(j)). Hence, π
r
Σ(i) 6< π
r
Σ(j).
Thus, i does not Σ-precede j. Since i is Σ-right, then ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case “i is Σ-left and ]−∞, (0, πrΣ(i))[ does not contain (0, π
r
Σ(j))”. Since ]−∞, (0, π
r
Σ(i))[
does not contain (0, πrΣ(j)), then (0, π
r
Σ(j)) 6≺ (0, π
r
Σ(i)). Hence, π
r
Σ(j) 6< π
r
Σ(i). Thus, j
does not Σ-precede i. Since i is Σ-left, then ai⊲aj 6∈ Σ: a contradiction.
PROOF OF FACT 4.13. Obvious.
PROOF OF FACT 4.14. Suppose KaiΣ ⊆ ∆. By Fact 4.13, it suffices to demonstrate that
urΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
r
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆. Let j
Σ
1 , . . . , j
Σ
lΣ
being a list of all the positive integers jΣ ≤ n
such that ai⊲ajΣ ∈ Σ and j
∆
1 , . . . , j
∆
l∆
being a list of all the positive integers j∆ ≤ n such
that ai⊲aj∆ ∈∆. Since KaiΣ ⊆∆, then these two lists are equal (use axioms Ax3, Ax4 and
Ax6). Obviously,
• if i is Σ-right and i is ∆-right, or i is Σ-left and i is ∆-left then urΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆ and u
l
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆,
• if i is Σ-right and i is ∆-left, or i is Σ-left and i is ∆-right then urΣ ≡
T
ai
ul∆ and u
l
Σ ≡
T
ai
ur∆.
Hence, urΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
r
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆ and u
l
Σ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
l
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆.
PROOF OF FACT 4.15. By induction on ψ(a1, . . . , ak). The argument is similar to that given
in Blackburn et al. [5, Lemma 4.21]. The case for ai⊲aj follows from Fact 4.12. The cases
for the Boolean connectives follow from the fact that Σ is an n-maximal Lmin-consistent set
of formulas. It remains to deal with the epistemic connective Kai . By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3
and Fact 4.11, WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) iff W
T
s , u
l
Σ |=
T Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an). Hence,
it suffices to demonstrate that WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) iff Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Σ.
Suppose WTs , u
r
Σ |=
T Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) and Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) 6∈ Σ. Since Kaiψ(a1, . . . ,
an) 6∈ Σ, then KaiΣ ∪ {¬ψ(a1, . . . , an)} is an Lmin-consistent set of formulas. Hence,
by Lemma 4.8, there exists an n-maximal Lmin-consistent set ∆ of formulas such that
KaiΣ ∪ {¬ψ(a1, . . . , an)} ⊆ ∆. Thus, KaiΣ ⊆ ∆ and ¬ψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∆. Since KaiΣ
⊆ ∆, then by Fact 4.14, urΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
r
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆. Since ¬ψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∆, then by
induction hypothesis, WTs , u
r
∆ 6|=
T ψ(a1, . . . , an) and W
T
s , u
l
∆ 6|=
T ψ(a1, . . . , an). Since
urΣ ≡
T
ai
ur∆, or u
r
Σ ≡
T
ai
ul∆, then W
T
s , u
r
Σ 6|=
T Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an): a contradiction.
Suppose Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Σ and W
T
s , u
r
Σ 6|=
T Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an). Since W
T
s , u
r
Σ 6|=
T
Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an), then there exists a T -world v in W
T
s such that u
r
Σ ≡
T
ai
v and WTs , v 6|=
T
ψ(a1, . . . , an). Without loss of generality, we can assume that for all positive integers k ≤
n, xv(ak) ∈ {(0, l): l ≤ n is a positive integer}. Let G = {a1, . . . , an} and ~u
r
Σ, ~v be the
G-vectors associated to urΣ, v in the obvious way. Obviously, W
T
s , u
r
Σ |=
T χ~urΣ and W
T
s , v
|=T χ~v . Since W
T
s , u
r
Σ |=
T χ~urΣ , then by Fact 4.12, χ~u
r
Σ
∈ Σ. Since urΣ ≡
T
ai
v, then ~urΣ
≡Gai ~v. Hence, χ~urΣ → Kˆaiχ~v is an instance of axiom Ax5. Since χ~urΣ ∈ Σ, then Kˆaiχ~v
∈ Σ. Since Kaiψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Σ, then Kˆai(ψ(a1, . . . , an) ∧ χ~v) ∈ Σ. Thus, KaiΣ ∪
{ψ(a1, . . . , an)∧χ~v} is an Lmin-consistent set of formulas. Hence, by Lemma 4.8, there ex-
ists an n-maximal Lmin-consistent set ∆ of formulas such that KaiΣ∪{ψ(a1, . . . , an)∧χ~v}
⊆ ∆. Thus, ψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∆ and χ~v ∈ ∆. Since ψ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∆, then by induction
hypothesis, WTs , u
r
∆ |=
T ψ(a1, . . . , an). Since χ~v ∈∆, then by Fact 4.12, W
T
s , u
r
∆ |=
T χ~v .
SinceWTs , v |=
T χ~v , then u
r
∆ Zn v. SinceW
T
s , u
r
∆ |=
T ψ(a1, . . . , an), then by Lemmas 3.1
and 3.3, WTs , v |=
T ψ(a1, . . . , an): a contradiction.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.1. Given a quantified Boolean expression σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . ,
Pn) based on the propositional quantifiers σ1, . . . , σn and the Boolean variables P1, . . . , Pn,
we wish to construct a 1-world u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) and a formula φ(σ1P1 . . .
σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) such that σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a quantified
Boolean expression, is valid in quantified Boolean logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)),
considered as a formula, is true for u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) in W
1
s . Choose dis-
tinct agents a1, . . . , an and b1, . . . , bn. Let G = {a1, . . . , an} ∪ {b1, . . . , bn} and ψ be the
conjunction of the following literals based on G:
• for all positive integers i, j ≤ n such that i < j, the literals ai⊲¯aj and ai⊲¯bj ,
• the literal ai⊲¯bi,
• for all positive integers i, j ≤ n such that i > j, the literals ai⊲aj and ai⊲bj .
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FIG. 15. A simple R-world.
Obviously, ψ is true for a 1-world u in W1s iff u looks like the simple R-world depicted
in Figure 15. Let u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) be such a 1-world. Now, consider the
sequence φn+1, φn, . . . , φ1 of formulas defined as follows:
• φn+1 = θ(b1⊲a1, . . . , bn⊲an),
• for all positive integers k ≤ n, φk = if σk = ∃ then Kˆak(ψ∧φk+1) else Kak(ψ → φk+1).
Let φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) be φ1. Remark that u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn))
and φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) can be computed in logarithmic space. Moreover, the
reader may easily verify that σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a quantified
Boolean expression, is valid in quantified Boolean logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)),
considered as a formula, is true for u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) in W
1
s . Thus, the va-
lidity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the model checking problem with
respect to W1s .
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.3. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1. Given a quanti-
fied Boolean expression σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn) based on the propositional quantifiers
σ1, . . . , σn and the Boolean variables P1, . . . , Pn, we wish to construct a 2-world u(σ1P1 . . .
σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) and a formula φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) such that σ1P1 . . .
σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a quantified Boolean expression, is valid in quantified
Boolean logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)), considered as a formula, is true for
u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) in W
2
s . Choose distinct agents a1, . . . , an, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n and
b1, . . . , bn. Let G = {a1, . . . , an, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n}∪ {b1, . . . , bn} and χ be the conjunction of the
following literals based on G:
• for all positive integers i, j ≤ n such that i < j, the literals ai⊲¯aj , ai⊲¯a
′
j , ai⊲¯bj , a
′
i⊲¯aj ,
a′i⊲¯a
′
j and a
′
i⊲¯bj ,
• the literals ai⊲a
′
i, ai⊲¯bi, a
′
i⊲ai and a
′
i⊲¯bi,
• for all positive integers i, j ≤ n such that i > j, the literals ai⊲aj , ai⊲a
′
j , ai⊲bj , a
′
i⊲aj ,
a′i⊲a
′
j and a
′
i⊲bj .
Obviously, χ is true for a 2-world u in W2s iff u looks like the simple R
2-world depicted
in Figure 16. Let u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) be such a 2-world. Now, consider the
sequence φn+1, φn, . . . , φ1 of formulas defined as follows:
• φn+1 = θ(b1⊲a1, . . . , bn⊲an),
• for all positive integers k ≤ n, φk = if σk = ∃ then Kˆak(χ∧φk+1) else Kak(χ→ φk+1).
Let φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) be φ1. Remark that u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn))
and φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) can be computed in logarithmic space. Moreover, the
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FIG. 16. A simple R2-world.
reader may easily verify that σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a quantified
Boolean expression, is valid in quantified Boolean logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)),
considered as a formula, is true for u(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) in W
2
s . Thus, the va-
lidity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the model checking problem with
respect to W2s .
PROOF OF LEMMA 6.1. Given a quantified Boolean expression σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . ,
Pn) based on the propositional quantifiers σ1, . . . , σn and the Boolean variables P1, . . . , Pn,
we wish to construct a formula φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) such that σ1P1 . . . σnPn
θ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a quantified Boolean expression, is valid in quantified Boolean
logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)), considered as a formula, is satisfiable in W
1
s .
Choose distinct agents a1, . . . , an and b1, . . . , bn. Let G = {a1, . . . , an} ∪ {b1, . . . , bn}
and ψ be the conjunction of literals based on G defined in the proof of Lemma 5.1. Let
φn+1, φn, . . . , φ1 be the sequence of formulas defined in the proof of Lemma 5.1. Let
φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) be ψ ∧ φ1. Remark that φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn))
can be computed in logarithmic space. Moreover, the reader may easily verify that σ1P1 . . .
σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a quantified Boolean expression, is valid in quantified
Boolean logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)), considered as a formula, is satisfiable in
W1s . Hence, the validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the satisfiability
problem with respect to W1s .
PROOF OF LEMMA 6.3. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.1. Given a quanti-
fied Boolean expression σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn) based on the propositional quantifiers
σ1, . . . , σn and the Boolean variables P1, . . . , Pn, we wish to construct a formula φ(σ1P1 . . .
σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) such that σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a quantified
Boolean expression, is valid in quantified Boolean logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)),
considered as a formula, is satisfiable in W2s . Choose distinct agents a1, . . . , an, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n
and b1, . . . , bn. Let G= {a1, . . . , an, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n}∪{b1, . . . , bn} and χ be the conjunction of
literals based on G defined in the proof of Lemma 5.3. Let φn+1, φn, . . . , φ1 be the sequence
of formulas defined in the proof of Lemma 5.3. Let φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) be
χ∧φ1. Remark that φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn)) can be computed in logarithmic space.
Moreover, the reader may easily verify that σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1, . . . , Pn), considered as a
quantified Boolean expression, is valid in quantified Boolean logic iff φ(σ1P1 . . . σnPnθ(P1,
. . . , Pn)), considered as a formula, is satisfiable inW
2
s . Hence, the validity problem of quan-
tified Boolean logic is reducible to the satisfiability problem with respect to W2s .
